The trigger changes. The weakness does not.
Over the past five years, Ethiopia has absorbed a succession of external shocks that, at first glance, appear unrelated. A pandemic paralysed global supply chains. Russia's invasion of Ukraine disrupted grain, fertiliser and energy markets. More recently, renewed attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea have heightened concerns over freight costs and maritime insurance.
Different crises. Different origins. The same economic fault line has been exposed each time: Ethiopia's dependence on imported essentials.
The latest attacks on vessels in the Red Sea are only the most recent reminder that the country's economic resilience is still shaped by events unfolding far beyond its borders. When commercial shipping becomes more expensive or uncertain, Ethiopia feels the effects long before cargo reaches Djibouti. Insurance premiums rise, freight charges increase and delivery schedules become less predictable. The additional costs are eventually passed on through transport, manufacturing and retail prices. This is not simply the consequence of being landlocked. It reflects the structure of the economy itself.
Despite years of economic reforms, Ethiopia continues to rely heavily on imported fuel, fertiliser, pharmaceuticals, machinery, industrial chemicals and production inputs. These are not luxury goods that households or businesses can easily postpone purchasing. They are the basic ingredients of economic activity. Factories require imported machinery and spare parts to keep production lines operating. When the price or availability of these inputs changes, the entire economy feels the consequences.
The pattern has repeated itself with remarkable consistency. The COVID-19 pandemic first exposed how vulnerable global supply chains had become. As manufacturing slowed and shipping networks broke down, countries across the world struggled to obtain medical equipment and industrial inputs. Ethiopia was no exception. The disruption demonstrated that supply-chain resilience had become as important as macroeconomic stability.
The Russia-Ukraine war revealed another dimension of the same vulnerability. Ethiopia imports most of its chemical fertiliser requirements. As global fertiliser prices surged, the country's import bill increased sharply. The Ethiopian Agricultural Trading Corporation spent approximately 1.1 billion US dollars on fertiliser imports for the 2023 planting season, almost double the 575 million US dollars spent a year earlier, despite importing around 11 percent less fertiliser and remaining roughly 30 percent below estimated national demand.
The country was paying significantly more while receiving less. The episode illustrated how external price shocks can directly affect domestic food production, inflation and economic stability.
A foreign exchange problem was also part of the production problem. Even the exchange-rate reforms introduced over the past two years illustrate the limits of macroeconomic policy. A more flexible exchange rate can improve foreign currency allocation and strengthen export competitiveness over time. But it does not eliminate the need to import fuel, fertiliser or medicines. For goods with limited domestic alternatives, depreciation changes the cost of imports far more quickly than it changes the country's dependence on them.
Recent tensions in the Middle East reinforce the same lesson. Rising energy prices and shipping disruptions have increased pressure on countries that depend heavily on imported petroleum and maritime trade.
The instinctive response to these episodes has often been to manage the consequences. The National Bank tightens monetary policy to contain inflation. The government seeks additional foreign exchange. Businesses adjust prices to reflect higher costs. These measures are necessary, but they remain largely reactive.
The more fundamental question is why every external disruption continues to expose the same weakness. The recent reforms in the country have begun addressing some of these vulnerabilities. The exchange rate has been liberalised. Credit growth restrictions have been removed. Capital markets are emerging. The banking sector is gradually opening to foreign competition. These changes aim to improve the allocation of resources and strengthen the foundations for private investment.
Beyond financial reforms, policymakers have also started pursuing measures aimed at strengthening domestic production. The Made in Ethiopia initiative has sought to expand local manufacturing capacity and encourage domestic production. The pharmaceutical sector has made progress in increasing local manufacturing capabilities, an important step in reducing reliance on imported medicines and medical supplies.
The electric mobility strategy represents a more ambitious attempt to address one of the country's largest import dependencies: petroleum. By replacing part of fuel demand with electricity generated domestically, the strategy aims to reduce exposure to global fuel price volatility while easing pressure on foreign exchange reserves. In a country where fuel imports have repeatedly created economic pressure, shifting transport demand towards locally generated energy represents a wider economic resilience strategy.
However, efficient financial markets and individual policy initiatives cannot by themselves eliminate structural vulnerabilities.
No central bank can lower maritime insurance premiums in the Red Sea. Interest rate decisions cannot reduce the global price of fertiliser. Fiscal discipline cannot prevent manufacturers from facing shortages of imported machinery. Sound macroeconomic management can cushion external shocks, but it cannot replace the need for a stronger productive base.
The next phase of reform should therefore focus on building an economy that is less vulnerable to external disruptions.
Reducing import dependence does not mean attempting to produce everything domestically. Such a strategy would be expensive and unrealistic. It means identifying strategic sectors where Ethiopia can competitively produce more locally while expanding exports that generate the foreign exchange needed to finance unavoidable imports.
Manufacturing remains central to that effort because it creates value beyond employment. Stronger industrial capacity can reduce reliance on imported finished goods while creating export opportunities. Expanding agricultural productivity can reduce pressure from food imports. Developing industries that process local raw materials into higher-value products can improve foreign exchange earnings.
But achieving this requires more than policy announcements. Domestic industries need reliable electricity, access to finance, predictable regulation, skilled workers and efficient logistics. Without these foundations, local production may struggle to compete with imported alternatives.
The challenge is not simply producing more goods within Ethiopia. It is creating an economy capable of absorbing external shocks without allowing every international disruption to translate into higher prices, weaker production and renewed foreign exchange pressure.
The global environment is unlikely to become more stable. Geopolitical tensions, supply-chain disruptions and maritime insecurity are becoming persistent features of the world economy. Ethiopia cannot prevent conflicts in distant regions or control global commodity prices.
But it can reduce the extent to which those events determine domestic economic outcomes.
Five years of repeated shocks have delivered the same lesson. The country's vulnerability is no longer difficult to identify. Until Ethiopia strengthens its productive capacity, develops competitive industries and expands exports, external events will continue to have an outsized influence on inflation, production and growth.
The next disruption will come from somewhere else. The question is whether Ethiopia will face it with the same dependence it carried into the last one
