Ethiopia is trying to build something it has never had at scale: a financial system in which ordinary citizens can invest their savings in businesses, companies can raise capital from the public and investors can trade financial claims with confidence.
That project requires more than a stock exchange, new regulations and foreign investors. It requires trust. And trust is becoming an increasingly expensive commodity.
A few months ago, an alleged fintech investment fraud involving losses reported at more than 1.9 billion birr shook public confidence. Several defendants were granted bail in May while investigations continued. Now controversy surrounding YBS Market is generating another wave of anxiety among people who say they entrusted substantial sums to the company. The claims circulating on social media require investigation and should not be confused with a judicial finding of fraud.
But the larger economic question is already visible. What happens to a country trying to build a capital market when people can no longer tell the difference between a genuine investment opportunity and a sophisticated promise?
The answer is uncomfortable. The damage will not be confined to the people who lose money. It will fall on legitimate businesses, investors, financial institutions and, ultimately, the economic reforms themselves.
Ethiopia has spent the past two years pushing its financial system towards a more market-based model. The National Bank of Ethiopia has liberalised important parts of the foreign-exchange regime and opened the door to foreign participation in banking. The Ethiopian Capital Market Authority is building the regulatory architecture for securities markets. The country's first stock exchange has given companies a new potential avenue for raising capital and citizens a new avenue for investing it.
These reforms are meant to replace an economy in which capital was allocated largely through administrative channels with one in which prices, risk and returns play a larger role. That transition cannot work without confidence. A capital market is, at its heart, a machinery for converting trust into capital.
An investor buys a share because he believes the company's accounts are reasonably reliable, its management is accountable and the legal system will protect his rights. A depositor puts money in a bank because he believes the institution will return it. A person buys a bond because he believes the issuer will honour its obligations.
Remove that confidence and the machinery starts to seize. This is why financial fraud is economically different from ordinary theft.
A thief takes money from a victim. A financial fraud can teach thousands of people that investing itself is dangerous.
That distinction matters enormously for Ethiopia. The country needs households to move some savings into productive investment. It needs companies to raise long-term capital. It needs pension funds, institutional investors and individuals to participate in domestic markets. It needs entrepreneurs to persuade investors to finance factories, technology, logistics, agriculture and other productive enterprises.
If the public response to every investment opportunity becomes, "I would rather keep my money in cash", the capital market will remain shallow.
The paradox is that the more Ethiopia succeeds in opening its financial system, the more sophisticated its fraud risks can become.
The old financial system was restrictive partly because it was designed to control flows of capital. The new one is designed to facilitate them. That is economically desirable, but openness creates a different requirement: the state must become better at distinguishing legitimate risk-taking from abuse.
The National Bank's own financial-stability assessment says systemic risk remains low, while warning that some risks have increased and require preventive action. That distinction is important. A few alleged frauds do not mean Ethiopia's financial system is collapsing.
But they can still damage the foundations on which that system is being built.
The most troubling feature of some investment controversies is not simply the promise of unusually high returns. It is the way credibility is manufactured.
A government official appears at a company's event. A senior public figure shares a platform with its management. A celebrity promotes the business. Influencers praise its founder. Photographs circulate online.
For an investor who does not have access to audited accounts, corporate records or regulatory databases, these images can function as a form of due diligence. That is dangerous.
An official appearing at a corporate event does not necessarily mean the government has approved the company's financial products. A celebrity endorsing a business is not a statement about its solvency. A successful entrepreneur's reputation is not a substitute for audited financial statements.
But ordinary investors do not always make these distinctions. In a society where government institutions remain among the most powerful sources of credibility, the presence of an official can carry more weight than the fine print of an investment agreement. A celebrity can provide something just as valuable: social proof.
The returns then become almost secondary. This is why public officials should be considerably more careful about the corporate events they attend, particularly where a company is soliciting investment from the public. The issue is not whether officials should attend private-sector events. They should. The issue is whether their presence can reasonably be interpreted as government endorsement of a financial product.
The distinction between being present and approving needs to be made unmistakable.
The same applies to celebrities and influencers. Promoting a restaurant and promoting an investment product are not economically equivalent activities. If a person persuades thousands of followers to entrust their savings to a company, the reputational responsibility is much greater.
A commercial company may be legally registered. It may hold a business licence. It may invite senior officials to its events. It may employ celebrities and influencers to promote its products.
None of these things, by themselves, necessarily mean that the company is authorised to mobilise money from the public or offer a financial product.
Yet to an ordinary citizen, the difference can be almost invisible.
This is where Ethiopia's emerging capital-market framework becomes particularly relevant. The Capital Market Proclamation No. 1248/2021 was introduced to create a regulatory framework for the capital market, including the raising of capital from investors and the protection of those investors. It establishes rules governing securities and public offerings, while giving the Ethiopian Capital Market Authority responsibility for regulating and supervising activities within its mandate.
The subsequent Public Offering and Trading of Securities Directive further establishes requirements for the public offering of securities, including registration requirements except where exemptions apply.
The significance of this framework extends beyond the formal stock market.
It raises a fundamental question that Ethiopia's regulators increasingly need to answer whenever a company mobilises substantial sums from members of the public.
Capital markets have a simple rule that social media often ignores: claims about money require evidence about money.
If a company promises extraordinary returns, investors should be able to understand where those returns come from.
If one million birr supposedly generates a fixed monthly return while the original capital remains intact, the obvious question is not whether the founder is charismatic. It is: what is the underlying cash-generating asset?
A factory? Export revenues? Property? Trading margins? A portfolio of securities? Loans? Something else?
And if the answer is "the business is growing rapidly", investors should be able to examine the revenues, costs, assets, liabilities and cash flows that make the growth credible.
That is precisely what capital-market regulation is designed to achieve.
The emerging controversy around YBS therefore deserves to be treated not merely as a story about allegedly disappointed investors, but as a test of the country’s developing market institutions.
The authorities need to establish basic facts: how much money was raised, from how many people, under what contracts, for what stated purpose, through which accounts and where the funds went. If the activity involved a financial product requiring regulatory authorisation, that should be established. If it did not, that should also be clear.
The public does not need speculation. It needs an audit trail. That trail is more important than the personalities involved. Because the greatest danger is to allow financial scandals to become personality dramas. A founder becomes the villain; investors become the gullible victims; celebrities become accomplices or defenders; officials become subjects of online outrage. The deeper institutional question gets lost.
Who was responsible for making sure the public could understand what it was buying?
A modern capital market cannot operate on the assumption that every citizen is a forensic accountant. Disclosure exists precisely because information is unevenly distributed between the seller and the buyer.
The investor knows what he has saved. The company knows what it is selling.
The regulator is supposed to make sure that the gap between the two does not become an opportunity for abuse.
This is also why Ethiopia should resist the temptation to respond to financial scandals by simply tightening everything.
Overregulation can be as damaging as under-regulation. If legitimate entrepreneurs cannot raise capital without navigating prohibitive barriers, money will remain concentrated in banks or outside formal investment channels. Innovation will suffer.
The answer is smarter regulation: clear licensing boundaries, mandatory disclosure, enforceable advertising standards, beneficial-ownership transparency, independent audits, investor education and rapid intervention where suspicious fund mobilisation is detected.
Most importantly, the public needs a simple way to check whether an investment opportunity is regulated.
The country's new capital-market architecture makes this increasingly possible. ECMA has said that financial-sector reforms are intended to improve transparency and support the development of the capital market. That ambition should now be matched by a culture in which the public understands that registration is not the same as endorsement, publicity is not disclosure and celebrity is not due diligence.
There is another reason to take this seriously.
Ethiopia is trying to attract capital at precisely the moment when it needs to convince investors that the rules of its emerging market are becoming more predictable. The country's debt restructuring is moving towards implementation after official creditors backed the preliminary agreement with private bondholders, although concerns remain about the proposed new-money warrant.
Attracting capital from abroad and mobilising it domestically are different exercises, but both depend on the same underlying asset: credibility.
An economy cannot tell foreign investors that it is becoming more transparent while allowing domestic investors to navigate a marketplace where social influence can substitute for disclosure.
Nor can it ask citizens to participate in a new capital market while leaving them unsure whether a company soliciting their savings is a commercial enterprise, an investment vehicle or something that requires a financial licence.
The irony is that Ethiopia's economic reforms make this issue more urgent, not less.
The country is moving from a system in which the state controlled much of the financial architecture towards one in which markets are expected to allocate more capital.
That means trust must move from personalities to institutions.
The investor should not need to know the founder personally.
He should need only to know what the company is legally permitted to do, what it owns, what it earns, what it owes, what risks he is taking and what protections exist if things go wrong.
That is what a functioning capital market looks like.
If Ethiopia gets this right, today's scandals can become an important lesson in the construction of tomorrow's financial system.
If it gets it wrong, every new fraud will deepen the same cycle: people lose money, confidence falls, legitimate businesses suffer, regulators tighten rules, innovation slows and the public becomes even more suspicious of investment.
That would be an expensive way to learn that markets are built not only with capital, but with credibility.
Ethiopia cannot build its new financial economy on borrowed trust.
It must build it on evidence.
