Ethiopia has spent years creating banks. It may now need to spend the next few merging them.
The country’s banking industry is crowded with small institutions, many of them built around regional, communal or identity-based capital mobilisation. That model was useful. It helped raise money in a country with a shallow capital market and limited avenues for private investment.
But what was once a strength is becoming a constraint.
A bank built around identity can struggle to behave like an ordinary commercial institution. A merger ceases to be merely a question of capital, efficiency or survival. It becomes a question of whose name survives, where the headquarters sits, who controls the board and which group appears to have surrendered to another.
That is no way to run a financial system.
Banks exist to allocate capital, not to preserve sentiment.
The problem is made worse by scale. Ethiopia has many banking licences but relatively few institutions with the balance sheets, technology and risk capacity required to finance large businesses and major investments. Several small banks chasing the same deposits, customers and foreign currency do not necessarily create meaningful competition. Sometimes they merely divide an already thin market.
Foreign competition will make this more obvious. So will rising capital requirements.
For smaller banks, consolidation should therefore be treated not as humiliation but as strategy. Two mediocre balance sheets may make one respectable bank.
There is another uncomfortable question: ownership.
Ethiopian banks often boast thousands of shareholders. That sounds democratic. It may be less so than it appears.
Every new capital increase favours those with cash. Wealthier investors can repeatedly subscribe for more shares; smaller shareholders cannot always keep pace. Over time, institutions that began with broadly distributed ownership may quietly become more concentrated in the hands of a relatively small group of wealthy investors.
Counting shareholders is therefore not enough. Regulators and the public should pay more attention to who actually owns meaningful stakes, who controls voting blocs and who dominates boards.
Ethiopia’s banking problem is thus not simply that some banks are small. It is that three weaknesses reinforce one another: fragmented institutions, identity-based ownership and increasingly concentrated capital.
The answer is not another wave of bank formation.
It is consolidation.
Banks that make commercial sense together should merge. Shareholder structures should become more transparent. Boards should think beyond institutional pride. And banks that began as community projects must eventually become national financial institutions.
Ethiopia does not need more bank names.
It needs bigger balance sheets, broader ownership and institutions that are harder to identify by ethnicity than by what they actually finance.
The age of opening banks has run its course. The age of combining them should begin.
