Fresh governments are a staple of Ethiopian politics. Ministers are appointed, portfolios reshuffled, speeches delivered, and the machinery of state gets a new coat of paint. What happens beneath the paint is another matter.
Ethiopia is not short of plans. It has a home-grown reform agenda, a ten-year development plan, a national dialogue commission and sector roadmaps aplenty. Its trouble is more mundane. For many of its 130 million people, the state remains distant, slow, costly, capricious and, too often, violent. The new government's first task is to avoid mistaking a change of personnel for a change of system.
Start with peace. Since 2018 Ethiopia has lurched from one conflict to the next: the war in Tigray, which killed hundreds of thousands, then insurgencies in Amhara and Oromia that still rumble on. Disputes over identity, territory and the balance of federal power have moved too readily from parliament to the battlefield. War kills people first and balance-sheets later, but it does both. It inflates spending, deters investors, disrupts trade, wrecks infrastructure and erodes the tax base.
No economic programme can outrun permanent insecurity. Ending the fighting should be treated not as a security chore but as the foundation of economic policy. That requires political settlements sturdy enough to survive the next quarrel, not merely ceasefires. The aim is not to abolish disagreement, which is impossible, but to make it non-violent. That is what functioning states do.
Next, make reform felt. To its credit, the government has done things that seemed politically unthinkable a few years ago. In July 2024 it let the birr float as part of an IMF-backed programme. Monetary policy has been tightened, banking opened to foreign competition and the budget squeezed. Yet macroeconomic stabilisation must eventually pass a cruder test: do people notice? Reserves can rise while households struggle; inflation can slow while prices stay punishing; investment rules can improve while firms still cannot get credit.
The next phase should be less about announcing reform than about transmitting it, into jobs, purchasing power and credit for productive firms rather than well-connected ones. A market economy that turns out merely to be a more expensive one will not keep public support for long. If ministers cannot tell an ordinary Ethiopian what reform has changed in her life, the politics of reform will sour.
The third priority is the least glamorous: the civil service. Officials issue licences, collect taxes, administer land, run schools, clear imports and manage public money. Every grand policy ends up on somebody's desk. Ethiopia's bureaucrats are underpaid, overpoliticised and poorly equipped, and policy suffers accordingly. Pay should rise, but a better-paid inefficient bureaucracy is merely a dearer one. The bargain should be explicit: more money for higher standards. That means competitive recruitment, promotion on merit, consequences for poor performance and an end to political appointees seeping deep into the professional ranks. Competent government costs money. There is no cheap shortcut.
Better pay would help with corruption, too. Ethiopia talks about graft often and prosecutes it fitfully. For most citizens, though, it is less a scandal than a nuisance: the delayed permit, the rigged tender, the customs clearance that somehow moves faster for someone else, the land deal that needs the right friend. Each is small; together they amount to a tax on the law-abiding.
The remedy is less theatre and more plumbing. Digitise services, publish procurement data, follow up audits, demand meaningful asset declarations, curb officials' discretion and protect those who refuse improper orders. Above all, apply the rules evenly. Selective anti-corruption drives are not anti-corruption; they are politics. The test is whether those close to power run the same risks as everyone else.
A related ambition sounds modest but is quietly radical: a state that works without intervention. Too much in Ethiopia moves only by escalation. A business problem lands on a minister's desk because a lower office failed; a citizen needs a connection because a process stalled; a project needs a political nudge because departments cannot co-ordinate. That is not access but institutional weakness in disguise. A license should arrive because the application was complete. A tax dispute should be settled because the rules are clear. Most citizens should rarely need to know who the minister is. Such competence seldom makes headlines, which is rather the point.
To get there, the cabinet should be treated less as a gallery of personalities than as a set of contracts. Each big ministry should publish first-year targets: how far processing times will fall, how many services will move online, how many jobs and how much export revenue will be generated, how much better procurement will save, how many displaced people will return home safely. Then it should publish the results. Ethiopian politics spends too long on who holds office and too little on what they do with it. A ministerial title should not count as an achievement.
The danger for the new government is not a lack of agenda but a surfeit. Peace, reform, state capacity, graft, unemployment, displacement, schooling, infrastructure, debt and reconciliation all clamour for attention. Sequencing will matter more than ambition. In five years Ethiopians should be able to ask a few simple questions. Is the country more peaceful? Are people better off? Does the bureaucracy work? Is corruption harder? Are political quarrels less likely to become wars? If the answers are yes, this government will have changed the country. If not, Ethiopia will reach its next election with a new cabinet, a new strategy and the same old problems. That would be the costliest sort of continuity.
A government is not new because ministers take new oaths. It is new when citizens no longer have to put up with the old state.
