The National bank of Ethiopia has spent the past year tightening policy in an effort to bring inflation under control. Interest rates have been held firm, reserve requirements raised, and credit growth formally capped. On paper, the stance is restrictive. In practice, liquidity is still swelling through the system.
The latest quarterly update from the Ethiopian Economics Association lays bare the tension. Broad money expanded by nearly 40 percent year-on-year, while reserve money climbed more than 70 percent. Banks are holding excess reserves at levels far above historical norms. Even as inflation has eased to single digits, the underlying liquidity story points in a different direction: one of abundance, not constraint.
This is not a minor inconsistency. It goes to the heart of whether the current policy framework can deliver durable stability.
Part of the explanation lies beyond the central bank’s immediate control. Foreign exchange inflows, particularly from exports, have injected substantial amounts of birr into the system. These inflows strengthen external buffers, but they also expand domestic liquidity. The central bank has attempted to absorb this through higher reserve requirements, which increased from 7 percent to 10 percent in December 2025 and liquidity operations. The effort, however, appears partial. Excess reserves remain elevated, suggesting that sterilisation is lagging behind inflows.
At the same time, credit continues to expand at a pace that sits uneasily with a tightening narrative. The ceiling on lending growth has been raised rather than reduced, while private banks have accelerated disbursements sharply. Liquidity, instead of being contained, is being recycled through the banking system. This creates a feedback loop where policy signals point in one direction, while financial conditions drift in another.
The result is a form of monetary ambiguity. Inflation has declined, but not solely because liquidity has been tamed. Improved agricultural supply and easing food prices have played a role. That raises a harder question: what happens when these temporary factors fade, while liquidity remains elevated?
The shift to an interest rate based framework was meant to modernise policy and improve control over such dynamics. Yet its effectiveness depends on transmission. Here, the constraints are structural. Financial markets remain shallow, the interbank market is only beginning to deepen, and alternative channels such as capital markets are currently largely absent. Without these mechanisms, policy rates struggle to anchor broader financial conditions.
The persistence of excess liquidity also distorts incentives within the banking sector. When funds are plentiful, the urgency to price risk carefully weakens. Lending can expand quickly, often into familiar sectors such as trade and construction, reinforcing concentration risks. At the same time, rising treasury bill yields offer banks a low risk alternative, potentially diverting funds away from private investment. Liquidity, in this sense, does not just exist; it shapes behaviour.
Both theory and empirical evidence offer no settled view on how inflation, economic growth and money supply interact. The relationship remains contested.
The long-standing monetarist view, associated with Milton Friedman, holds that rapid growth in money supply leads to inflation. Yet experience in the aftermath of the Great Recession has challenged that assumption, as inflation remained subdued despite a sharp expansion in liquidity.
A cross-country study by Richard Vague reinforces this divergence. Examining 47 economies, it finds no consistent link between rapid money supply growth and inflation. In many cases, inflation occurred without prior monetary expansion, while large increases in money supply did not lead to sustained price rises. The evidence points to a broader set of drivers, including demand conditions, debt levels and structural factors.
Another study by Claudio Borio, Boris Hofmann and Egon Zakrajšek finds that money growth and inflation re-emerged as closely linked during the post-pandemic period.
Across countries, strong money supply growth in 2020 was followed by higher inflation in 2021–22, with a significant statistical relationship even after accounting for fiscal stimulus and output recovery. However, the link weakens when extreme inflation cases are excluded and largely disappears when extended into 2022–23.
The study concludes that money growth can help explain inflation mainly in high-inflation environments, but its predictive power is inconsistent and depends on the inflation regime.
Ethiopian economists, however, present a more cautionary reading. They argue that recent gains in gross domestic product may partly reflect inflationary pressures linked to rapid monetary expansion, raising questions about the extent to which growth has been driven by real output rather than rising prices.
None of this negates the progress made. Inflation has moderated. The treasury bill market is attracting new participants. Direct monetary financing of the government has receded. These are meaningful shifts. But they coexist with a liquidity environment that remains fundamentally loose.
The policy challenge now is less about signalling restraint and more about enforcing it. That requires deeper coordination between monetary tools, more effective absorption of liquidity from external inflows, and a clearer alignment between credit policy and inflation objectives. It also demands faster development of financial markets so that policy signals can travel beyond the banking system.
Liquidity, left unmanaged, has a quiet way of returning as pressure. It may not immediately show in headline inflation, but it builds in asset markets, in exchange rate expectations, and in the balance sheets of banks. Ethiopia’s current moment is defined by this tension: a tightening framework operating in a system still awash with funds.
Stability will depend on resolving that contradiction, not merely managing its symptoms.
