Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s (PhD) visit to the Megech Irrigation Development Project was meant to signal momentum. The successful river diversion, he declared, marks an “important stage” in a scheme that is supposed — one day — to irrigate 17,000 hectares of farmland.
Yet Megech is not a fresh chapter in Ethiopia’s irrigation story. It is often lumped together with a decade of grand sugar-linked irrigation dreams, some of which never materialised. To be clear, Megech itself was not part of the sugar-estate programme. Its purpose was irrigation and urban water supply near Gondar. By contrast, Zarema Mayday and other dams were explicitly tied to sugar megaprojects such as the Wolkayit estates. Those sugar-linked schemes remain unfinished, over-budget, and debt-laden — billions of birr spent with little to show for it.
When PM Abiy (PhD) took office, his government pledged to clean up the state’s investment culture. The Ministry of Planning and Development was empowered to ensure that no major public project would proceed without rigorous feasibility studies. It was meant to be a firewall against the very failures Megech now exemplifies.
Yet the numbers suggest old habits die hard. Megech’s cost has swelled from 2.4 billion birr to 6.4 billion birr. Arjo–Dedesa’s costs have exploded by 760 percent. Gidabo has nearly tripled. Zarema Mayday has ballooned from 4.26 billion birr to 14.5 billion birr.
The bulk of these overruns are inherited — these projects were designed and started long before the current administration took office. But what cannot be excused is the government’s failure to communicate clearly: why costs escalated, what technical or managerial flaws necessitate additional funding, and how the extra budget will be used efficiently. Transparency is not optional. Taxpayers deserve explanations for every birr requested, alongside independent assessments of feasibility.
The Auditor General’s report shows this point: state projects in power, irrigation, roads, and universities requested nearly 300 billion birr in supplementary financing over three and a half years, often without fresh feasibility studies or adequate justification. Some funds went to completed projects; others to works that never began. Failing to communicate these discrepancies creates distrust, slows private investment, and casts doubt on the government’s reform promises.
And the costs of inaction are felt far beyond the Treasury. Every irrigation failure reverberates through the private sector. Ballooning state projects crowd out investment by absorbing scarce credit and foreign exchange. Had schemes like Megech, Arjo–Dedesa, or Zarema delivered even half their promise, they would have unlocked value chains — seeds, fertiliser, transport, cold chains, agro-processing, export logistics. Instead, the private sector contends with an economy where state missteps distort markets, raise borrowing costs, and erode investor confidence. Public inefficiency does not merely waste money; it stifles the very private dynamism Ethiopia claims to champion.
Irrigation should be Ethiopia’s strongest lever for food security. Today, it is its weakest. Persistent hunger, stalled local economies, and deepening scepticism are predictable outcomes of a decade of mismanagement and a half-decade of unkept reform promises.
Abiy’s visit to Megech was meant to showcase momentum. It should instead be a reminder: irrigation cannot be transformed through ceremonies. It can only be transformed through competence. And competence begins with a simple principle — no project should proceed without a study, and no study should be kept from the public.
