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Bread Before Ballots

Mintesinot Nigussie
June 1, 2026

Ethiopia enters its seventh general election with voters carrying something heavier than political conviction: economic fatigue.

For many citizens heading to polling stations on Monday, the defining question is not ideological. It is practical. Can life become affordable again?

The election comes after nearly eight years of sustained economic restructuring under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s administration. Since 2018 the government has pushed through one of the most ambitious reform programmes in modern Ethiopian history: currency liberalisation, subsidy rationalisation, state-sector adjustments, fiscal tightening and repeated negotiations with international lenders.

The latest and most consequential phase of that effort is anchored in an IMF-supported programme approved in 2024, backed by a four-year Extended Credit Facility worth about 3.4 billion US dollars. The arrangement sits at the centre of Ethiopia’s broader “homegrown” reform agenda and links external financing to a set of policy shifts aimed at restoring macroeconomic stability.

Those shifts are significant. The programme has accelerated exchange-rate liberalisation, allowing the birr to move towards a more market-determined level after years of administrative control. It has also tightened monetary policy, pushed for fiscal restraint and aligned Ethiopia’s debt strategy with the G20 Common Framework, under which negotiations with bilateral and private creditors are meant to restore debt sustainability.

In theory, the package is designed to correct long-standing distortions: chronic foreign-exchange shortages, widening parallel-market premiums and a debt profile increasingly difficult to service. In practice, it has brought forward a rapid price adjustment that households are still absorbing.

Currency depreciation has been one of the most visible transmission channels. As the birr has adjusted towards market levels, import prices have risen sharply in local currency terms, feeding through into fuel, food and transport costs. Inflation has proven sticky, and wage adjustments have lagged behind.

There have been real gains as well, indeed. Ethiopia’s external position has strengthened at the margins as foreign-exchange reforms have improved price discovery and reduced the distortions of the previous administratively controlled system. That shift has also helped export competitiveness in several sectors, contributing to export earnings of more than 8.7 billion US dollars in the first ten months of the fiscal year.

Improved foreign exchange inflows have in turn supported reserve accumulation. By end-2025, reserves had risen to above 4 billion US dollars, their highest level in five years. Industrial parks, logistics corridors and energy infrastructure continue to expand, reflecting a state still investing heavily in long-term productive capacity.

Ethiopia also remains engaged with international creditors under the G20 Common Framework, a structured if slow-moving path towards external debt restructuring.

But reform has not been neutral in its timing.

Since 2023, nominal indicators have been increasingly distorted by currency depreciation, inflation volatility and the transition towards a more market-based exchange rate regime. In US dollar terms, Ethiopia’s nominal GDP is estimated to have fallen from about 156 billion US dollars in 2023 to roughly 142 billion US dollars in 2024, before declining further into the 109–117 billion US dollars range in 2025, according to IMF-aligned estimates. Real activity has continued to expand in parts of the economy, but nominal measures have lost clarity as a guide to lived conditions. The result is an economy that can appear to be moving forward in aggregate terms while feeling increasingly constrained at household level.

Although inflation had recently eased towards single digits, renewed pressure from global fuel markets has pushed it to 11.7 percent in April, feeding directly into transport fares and urban living costs. For many households, macroeconomic stabilisation remains an abstraction. The language of reform is technocratic; its consequences are immediate and visible in daily survival.

Even in the final stretch of an election campaign, the dominant conversation is rarely political. It is economic arithmetic: rent, food, transport, and wages that no longer stretch as they once did.

This election is unfolding against a deeper structural shift in Ethiopia’s economy. In 2018 the official exchange rate stood at roughly 27 to 28 birr per US dollar. Following successive devaluations and a gradual move towards a more market-based regime, the currency has depreciated by roughly 450 percent. Economists long argued that the birr was overvalued, with official rates diverging sharply from parallel markets and distorting trade and foreign-exchange allocation. The correction has narrowed that gap, but it has also transmitted quickly into import prices in an economy heavily dependent on external inputs.

Fuel, medicine, machinery and consumer goods have all become more expensive in local currency terms. Businesses reliant on imported inputs face higher costs. Households absorb the adjustment through weaker purchasing power.

Yet macroeconomics is only part of the story.

Ethiopia’s internal instability has added a second layer of economic friction. In parts of Amhara, Tigray and Oromia, persistent insecurity has disrupted transport corridors, increased logistics costs and introduced uncertainty into domestic trade flows. The effect is less visible in headline statistics than in the price of moving goods from one region to another. What looks like inflation in Addis Ababa is, in part, a tax on distance imposed by insecurity.

Displacement linked to conflict has further altered local economies. Households moving into relatively stable towns have increased pressure on housing, informal labour markets and public services. Rental costs have tightened in several urban centres, while informal employment has expanded as new arrivals seek income in already constrained labour markets.

The economy is therefore absorbing multiple shocks at once: structural reform, currency adjustment, external financial uncertainty and internal fragmentation that raises the cost of basic coordination.

On the external front, debt restructuring under the G20 Common Framework has recently stalled again after negotiations with private bondholders broke down. The disagreement over Ethiopia’s Eurobond treatment has exposed a familiar fault line between official creditors and private investors over the scale and distribution of losses. The result is a process stuck between partial agreements and renewed impasse.

For Ethiopia this matters beyond balance sheets. External debt negotiations are now intertwined with domestic reform credibility. Progress with creditors affects access to financing, investor sentiment and the pace at which macroeconomic stabilisation can translate into growth.

The result is an economy moving on two tracks.

On one side are policymakers pointing to structural correction: a more flexible exchange rate, ongoing debt talks, infrastructure expansion and gradual integration into global financial systems. On the other are households experiencing a different reality: persistent price pressure, unstable incomes and a sense that adjustment has yet to deliver relief.

This gap between policy intent and lived experience is now the central tension in Ethiopia’s political economy.

It also helps explain the character of this election. In earlier cycles, economic debate was forward-looking, built around industrialisation, state-led development and long-term transformation. Today it is immediate. The question is no longer what Ethiopia will become, but whether the next month will be more expensive than the last.

Public spaces reflect this shift. Transport hubs, markets and neighbourhood shops have become informal indicators of economic sentiment. Conversations move fluidly between rising food prices, fuel costs and occasional acknowledgement of improved supply conditions and ongoing investment activity in infrastructure and industry.

There are, in other words, signs of movement as well as strain. Industrial expansion continues in selected corridors. Export sectors such as horticulture and light manufacturing have shown resilience. Infrastructure spending remains visible in roads, energy and logistics. Foreign-exchange allocation, though still constrained, is more market-responsive than in earlier phases of rigid control.

But these gains are unevenly felt, and unevenly distributed.

Opposition parties have been more effective at articulating dissatisfaction with rising living costs than at presenting detailed macroeconomic alternatives. That is unsurprising. Ethiopia’s constraints are structural: limited export capacity, a narrow tax base, high import dependence and recurring external financing needs. These are problems that resist simple political messaging.

So the election becomes something narrower and more elemental than ideology. It is a referendum, implicit rather than declared, on whether economic management is producing stability fast enough to match social strain.

In such an environment, legitimacy is no longer derived solely from political narrative or historical mandate. It is increasingly tied to performance: price stability, employment creation, currency predictability and the gradual restoration of purchasing power.

That shift does not diminish the importance of political institutions. It reframes them. Governance is now judged less by promise than by proximity to economic relief.

The difficulty for Ethiopia is timing. Structural reforms take years to bear fruit. Elections measure the present.

Between those two clocks lies the political tension of the moment.

Until they align, the most immediate verdict on power will not be delivered in speeches or manifestos. It will be written in the slow, weekly recalibration of what households can afford.

In Ethiopia today, the ballot box stands beside a more unforgiving measure of public sentiment: the price of bread.

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