The National Bank of Ethiopia’s financial results for the year ended June 2025 capture the hidden cost of long-delayed reform. After shifting to a more market-based foreign-exchange regime in July 2024, the central bank recorded a Birr 428.6 billion net operating loss, driven almost entirely by Birr 445.2 billion in unrealised foreign-exchange revaluation losses.
Operationally, however, the institution performed strongly. Core income rose sharply, gold trading generated substantial revenue, and the bank posted a Birr 16.7 billion operating surplus before exchange-rate effects. The headline loss, though eye-catching, reflects accounting reality rather than operational failure.
For years, Ethiopia maintained a tightly managed exchange rate that diverged from market conditions. The resulting distortions weakened export competitiveness, encouraged parallel markets and obscured the true cost of foreign-currency exposure.
In July 2024, the authorities abandoned this approach as part of an IMF-backed reform programme. The birr depreciated rapidly. Under international accounting rules, the central bank was required to revalue its foreign-currency assets and liabilities, revealing a Birr 445.2 billion unrealised loss, compared with just Birr 38.1 billion the year before.
No foreign currency was paid out. But years of misalignment were converted into a single, visible balance-sheet shock.
Stripped of exchange-rate effects, the story looks far healthier. Net interest income rose to Birr 22.5 billion, while net non-interest income surged to Birr 327.4 billion, driven mainly by Birr 275.2 billion in gold-related revenue. As a result, net operating income climbed to Birr 349.9 billion, nearly ten times the previous year’s level.
Before revaluation losses, the central bank generated an operating surplus of Birr 16.7 billion, which was transferred to the General Reserve under Ethiopia’s new central-bank law (Proclamation No. 1359/2025). The institution’s core financial performance, in other words, improved sharply.
Yet the final result was stark: a net operating loss of Birr 428.6 billion and a total comprehensive loss of Birr 395.5 billion. For a commercial firm, such figures would suggest collapse. For a central bank, they reflect the accounting consequences of reform.
The revaluation shock reshaped NBE’s balance sheet. Total assets jumped to Birr 1.66 trillion, from Birr 955 billion, reflecting higher foreign balances, gold holdings and domestic claims. Total liabilities climbed even faster, reaching Birr 2.04 trillion, driven by rising deposits, currency in circulation and foreign obligations.
The most striking change was in equity. From a modest positive balance the year before, NBE moved to negative equity of Birr 380 billion. The unrealised losses were transferred to the Revaluation Reserve, which fell to –Birr 441.4 billion, while the General Reserve improved to Birr 16.3 billion after the operating surplus transfer.
In corporate finance, negative equity signals distress. In central banking, it is less alarming. Monetary authorities can function with negative capital so long as they retain policy credibility, operational income and government backing. Still, the scale of Ethiopia’s deterioration is unusual and highlights how exposed its financial system has been to exchange-rate misalignment.
The balance sheet also reveals rising international entanglement. Balances due from foreign commercial and central banks reached about Birr 583 billion, while gold holdings stood at Birr 88.6 billion. On the liability side, amounts due to the IMF surged to Birr 394.2 billion, reflecting Ethiopia’s reliance on external financing during its reform phase.
In addition, the central bank holds USD 3 billion in time deposits from the Abu Dhabi Fund: a USD 1 billion facility from 2019 at three percent interest, and a USD 2 billion deposit from October 2023 at four percent, extended beyond its original maturity. These deposits provide foreign-currency liquidity but also add interest costs and rollover risk.
At home, the central bank remains the system’s anchor. Currency in circulation rose to Birr 344.5 billion, reflecting persistent inflationary pressures. Deposits from local financial institutions and government entities more than doubled to Birr 749.4 billion, reinforcing NBE’s role as lender and custodian of last resort.
Credit risk remains limited. Impairment provisions stood at just Birr 4.53 billion, about 0.53 percent of total loans, and the bank recorded a Birr 815.6 million reversal of expected credit losses. The vulnerabilities lie abroad, not at home.
Despite the scale of the losses, NBE received a clean audit opinion. Auditors highlighted four key risk areas: foreign-exchange exposure, negative equity, asset impairment and financial-instrument valuation. They concluded that management’s judgments were reasonable and that the bank remains a going concern, noting that the losses were largely unrealised and do not impair NBE’s ability to conduct monetary policy.
They also pointed to Ethiopia’s new central-bank law, which increases paid-up capital to Birr 10 billion, strengthens reserve rules and formalises the treatment of unrealised valuation effects. The accountants, in short, were not alarmed—even if the numbers looked alarming.
Exchange-rate liberalisation is rarely painless. It exposes imbalances that were previously hidden and forces institutions to confront uncomfortable realities. Ethiopia’s central bank has now done so—publicly and dramatically.
The FY2025 results do not signal institutional failure. They signal adjustment.
By correcting the birr’s value, Ethiopia has improved price discovery, reduced parallel-market distortions and aligned itself more closely with global norms. The accounting losses are the visible cost of that shift.
What matters now is persistence. If reform continues, reserves are rebuilt and inflation is contained, the balance sheet will stabilise over time. If policy wavers, confidence could erode.
For now, Ethiopia’s central bank has absorbed the shock. The question is whether the economy can absorb the reform.
