What collapsed was not the currency, but the policy that tried to command scarcity instead of confronting it.
By the time Ethiopia moved to liberalise its exchange-rate regime in July 2024, the fiction had become untenable. For years, the country sustained an economic model that appeared to deliver rapid growth—often above eight percent—while quietly eroding its macroeconomic foundations. Foreign-exchange rationing replaced markets. Central bank financing substituted for savings. An administratively managed exchange rate concealed a widening gap between the official value of the birr and economic reality.
In July 2024, under a four-year Extended Credit Facility arrangement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Ethiopia allowed the birr to adjust toward a market-determined rate. The immediate depreciation—nearly 50 percent in nominal terms—was painful. Inflation spiked. Balance sheets were revalued. Households and firms felt the shock. Critics denounced the reform as externally imposed austerity and a betrayal of the state-led development model.
They are right about one thing: the cost is real. But they are wrong about the alternative.
For much of the past decade, Ethiopia operated a tightly managed crawling peg. The official exchange rate drifted slowly, while underlying fundamentals deteriorated. The result was a substantial real effective exchange-rate overvaluation, chronic foreign-exchange shortages, and a parallel-market premium that at times exceeded 100 percent.
The macroeconomic consequences were predictable. By 2022/23, gross international reserves had fallen to roughly half a month of import cover—an extraordinarily fragile position. The current account remained under strain, public debt hovered around 40 percent of GDP (including guaranteed external liabilities), and inflation accelerated amid monetary financing of fiscal deficits.
This was not a growth miracle. It was a resource-allocation distortion on a national scale.
An overvalued currency taxes exporters and subsidises importers. It discourages tradable production, fuels rent-seeking in foreign-exchange allocation, and entrenches insiders who gain privileged access to scarce dollars. In such a system, private-sector dynamism is suppressed not by a lack of entrepreneurial capacity but by mispriced fundamentals.
No economy can sustainably build prosperity on a currency that does not reflect its productivity or external position.
The IMF-supported reform, embedded in Ethiopia’s Homegrown Economic Reform agenda, rests on macroeconomic fundamentals that critics label as submission to Western or corporate agendas. But current-account deficits do not arise from ideology, and overvalued currencies do not collapse because of geopolitics. They collapse because they defy economic logic.
First, exchange-rate flexibility restores price signals. By allowing the birr to depreciate toward market-clearing levels, the authorities corrected a deep real misalignment. The depreciation, while sharp, narrowed the parallel-market premium and began to reallocate resources toward export and import-substitution sectors.
Second, the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) introduced foreign-exchange auctions accessible to commercial banks, publishing allocation results and gradually limiting discretionary interventions. A quantitative ceiling on off-auction interventions was established to prevent quasi-fiscal distortions. Exporter surrender requirements are being phased out on a pre-announced roadmap. An interbank trading platform is scheduled to deepen market liquidity.
These are not ideological prescriptions. They are institutional mechanisms designed to move from administrative rationing to transparent price discovery.
Third, monetary policy is shifting toward an interest-rate-based framework. With the policy rate anchored in positive real territory, the NBE can focus on inflation stabilisation rather than defending an artificial exchange-rate peg. In open-economy macroeconomics, one cannot simultaneously fix the exchange rate, maintain monetary autonomy, and allow capital mobility. Ethiopia has chosen flexibility to regain policy credibility.
The early macroeconomic data suggest that the feared collapse has not materialised.
Real GDP growth in 2024/25 exceeded nine percent, supported by a strong trade balance. Coffee exports reached record volumes—around 470,000 tons—and gold exports rose sharply, contributing to a trade surplus exceeding four billion US dollars. Gross international reserves climbed from roughly 1.4 billion US dollars before the reform to more than four billion US dollars, approaching two months of import cover.
Inflation, though elevated, began to moderate, declining into the low teens year-on-year. The current account deficit stabilised.
Debt restructuring negotiations continue under the G20 Common Framework. While discussions with private creditors have proven more complex — as expected — the bilateral track has progressed well, securing relief that will save more than 2.5 billion US dollars in future debt-service payments.
These outcomes reflect not only IMF conditionality but domestic policy effort.
It is convenient to portray reform as externally dictated. In reality, Ethiopia’s authorities laid crucial groundwork.
They rebuilt reserves through tighter monetary conditions, export promotion, and gold purchases by the central bank. They liberalised sectors long closed to foreign participation—banking, telecommunications, logistics, and retail—attracting foreign direct investment and signalling a shift toward private-sector-led growth. They advanced privatisation plans for state-owned enterprises and launched a domestic securities exchange to deepen capital markets.
Fiscal consolidation has begun, with tax-base broadening and gradual subsidy reform. Fuel pricing has moved toward cost recovery. Electricity tariffs have been adjusted. Public financial management reforms aim to reduce quasi-fiscal losses.
These measures are politically difficult. But they are essential for credibility. Exchange-rate reform without fiscal and structural adjustment would simply recreate imbalance.
The critics of IMF-supported reforms raise serious concerns.
Depreciation raises the local-currency cost of imported food, fuel, and medicine. The NBE has recorded substantial valuation losses on its foreign-currency balance sheet. Subsidy removal strains low-income households. Social tensions, already acute in parts of the country, risk intensification if adjustment is perceived as unfair.
Moreover, the historical record of IMF programmes in low-income countries is mixed. Excessively rapid consolidation can suppress growth. Insufficient attention to distributional impacts can entrench inequality. Markets do not automatically deliver equity.
These are legitimate warnings.
But the alternative—continuing to defend an unsustainable exchange rate with vanishing reserves—would have imposed far greater hardship. A disorderly collapse, abrupt import compression, or sovereign default would have devastated incomes far more severely than managed adjustment.
In macroeconomics, timing matters. Adjustment undertaken early, with external financing support and a policy anchor, is less costly than adjustment forced by crisis.
Ethiopia’s earlier model relied on heavy public investment financed by external borrowing and central bank credit, with the exchange rate serving as an anchor of political stability rather than economic equilibrium. That model delivered infrastructure—but also imbalances.
Reform is not about repudiating state ambition. It is about aligning ambition with constraints.
The IMF programme provides financing—approximately 3.4 billion US dollars over four years—but more importantly, it provides a framework. By committing to transparent foreign-exchange auctions, limits on discretionary interventions, and fiscal consolidation, Ethiopia signals to investors, donors, and its own citizens that macroeconomic stability is not optional.
Credibility lowers risk premiums. Lower risk premiums reduce borrowing costs. Reduced borrowing costs free fiscal space for social investment. The chain is indirect, but it is real.
No one should romanticise adjustment. The depreciation of over 100 percent in nominal terms is not a trivial event. Nor is the transition from administrative control to market allocation painless.
But a currency that misprices reality eventually forces a harsher reckoning.
Ethiopia’s exchange-rate reform is not an act of surrender to external pressure. It is a recognition that stability built on rationed dollars, suppressed prices, and opaque allocation is prosperity in name only.
The IMF deserves scrutiny. Conditionality must remain flexible. Social protection must be strengthened. Safety nets—such as the Productive Safety Net Programme—should be expanded to cushion vulnerable households. Growth must become more inclusive.
Yet acknowledging the costs does not invalidate the logic.
To dismantle a distorted system is to incur losses. To restore market signals is to expose hidden imbalances. To rebuild reserves is to constrain spending today in order to protect tomorrow.
The price is high. But so was the illusion.
Ethiopia has chosen adjustment over denial. In the long arc of economic development, that choice—painful though it may be—is the foundation of something real.
Zelalem Tamir is an economist by profession. He can be reached at zelalemteamir@gmail.com
