The National Bank of Ethiopia is busy again. Four years ago, it was scrambling to contain inflation that was racing towards 30 percent. Alarmed by rapid credit expansion that threatened to fuel even higher prices, the central bank reached for one of its most forceful tools: a 14 percent cap on annual loan growth.
Today, the central bank is busy once more. Inflation has fallen markedly from its peak but is beginning to climb again. Instead of tightening the same administrative controls, however, the NBE has dismantled the credit cap altogether and raised its policy rate—a seemingly expansionary move wrapped in an unequivocally tight monetary stance.
The apparent contradiction captures the central bank’s changing philosophy. The NBE is not abandoning control over credit. It is changing the way it exercises that control. Rather than imposing a uniform ceiling on all banks, it is moving towards influencing financial behaviour through interest rates, liquidity management and targeted regulatory interventions.
Beyond raising its policy rate to 16 percent, the NBE has made clear that it will impose additional reserve requirements on individual commercial banks whose lending is assessed as contributing to inflationary pressures. The credit cap may be gone, but the central bank has not stepped away from managing the pace at which money enters the economy. It has simply replaced a blunt instrument with a more targeted one.
This marks a significant transition for Ethiopia’s monetary policy. For years, the financial system operated largely through administrative directives. The NBE decided not only the direction of policy but also, in many cases, the boundaries within which banks could operate. The new framework places greater emphasis on market signals. Banks can decide where to allocate capital, but they must respond to the incentives created by interest rates, liquidity conditions and regulatory discipline.
That transition, however, comes with a challenge. The removal of the credit cap does not automatically mean businesses will find it easier to borrow.
Commercial banks have spent the past two years adapting to the constraints created by the lending restriction. Unable to expand loan books freely, many adjusted their balance sheets and became more selective in allocating credit. Government securities emerged as an increasingly attractive alternative. Commercial banks came to hold 45.3 percent of outstanding Treasury bills, while yields increased from 9.7 percent in June 2024 to 13.4 percent in June 2025 and 15.5 percent by September 2025.
For banks, the calculation was straightforward. Treasury bills offered predictable returns with limited risk compared with lending to businesses facing foreign exchange shortages, rising costs and uncertain repayment conditions. For the first time in five years, both lending rates and Treasury bill yields exceeded inflation, allowing banks to generate positive real returns from relatively safer assets.
That behaviour will not disappear overnight because the credit cap has been removed. Banks now have greater freedom to lend, but they will still allocate capital according to risk and return. The question facing every bank is not whether it is allowed to lend, but whether lending provides a better return than other available options.
Government securities are only one competing destination for liquidity. As Ethiopia develops its interbank market and strengthens monetary operations, banks will have additional ways to manage excess funds. Foreign currency assets, central bank liquidity instruments and lending to large established borrowers may also compete with lending to smaller firms and productive sectors.
This creates the central challenge for the NBE. The success of the reform will not be measured simply by whether total credit expands. It will depend on whether financial resources move towards sectors capable of increasing productivity, exports and investment.
The removal of the credit cap also changes the responsibility of commercial banks. Under the previous system, lenders could point to regulation as a reason for restrained lending. That explanation is becoming less convincing. If credit remains concentrated among large borrowers or continues flowing mainly towards low-risk assets, the debate will shift from regulation to the banks’ own allocation decisions.
Yet the NBE’s approach also carries risks. A targeted framework requires greater transparency and credibility than a simple lending ceiling. Banks need to understand how the central bank will determine when credit expansion becomes inflationary and when additional reserve requirements will be imposed. The success of market-based monetary policy depends not only on the tools available but also on confidence in how those tools will be used.
The credit cap was easy to understand. Every bank knew the limit. The new framework is more sophisticated but also more demanding. It requires the NBE to communicate clearly, act consistently and convince markets that interest rates and prudential tools can deliver what administrative restrictions once achieved.
Ethiopia’s monetary policy is entering a new phase. The removal of the credit cap is not the end of intervention. It is the beginning of a different kind of intervention—one based less on controlling banks directly and more on shaping the incentives that guide their decisions.
The real test is whether that transition can deliver both price stability and a financial system capable of funding economic growth.
