Ethiopia’s media debate has entered a dangerous phase: both the state and the press increasingly see themselves as victims of each other.
At the national forum on “Media Transformation for Narrative Building,” Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (PhD) defended the political opening that transformed Ethiopia’s media landscape after 2018. Journalists were released from prison. Exiled broadcasters returned. Blocked websites reopened. Fear, once institutionalised inside newsrooms, briefly loosened its grip.
Then came the flood.
The old Ethiopia had too little speech. The new Ethiopia suddenly had too much noise and too few guardrails.
The government says parts of the media weaponised freedom. Many journalists say the state still fears scrutiny the moment reporting touches conflict, power or political legitimacy. Both sides accuse the other of poisoning public trust. Both sides, at times, are correct.
This is no longer simply a press freedom story. It is a story about a country struggling to control the consequences of suddenly hearing itself too loudly.
Ethiopia did not merely liberalise its media space. It detonated decades of suppressed political emotion into the digital age all at once. Ethnic grievances, ideological battles, historical resentment, war narratives, diaspora anger and political propaganda collided inside smartphones before institutions were prepared to absorb them.
The result is a media environment where journalism, activism, entertainment and mobilisation increasingly occupy the same space.
A YouTube livestream can now influence political tensions faster than an official statement. Telegram channels shape public emotion before newspapers verify facts. TikTok creators can dominate national conversations while professional newsrooms struggle to finance basic reporting.
In this environment, attention has become more powerful than accuracy.
And that may be Ethiopia’s deepest media crisis.
The country is no longer fighting only over freedom of expression. It is fighting over who controls emotional reality itself.
The state calls for “responsible media” partly because it fears fragmentation, instability and disinformation. Journalists demand stronger protections because they fear arrests, intimidation and shrinking tolerance during moments of national tension. Citizens distrust both sides, consuming information while simultaneously doubting almost everything they hear.
This is what institutional fragility looks like in the algorithm era.
The prime minister’s “freed calf” analogy was politically revealing. It framed the media as a force released from restraint but not yet capable of self-control. Yet critics argue the state itself has also struggled to adapt to a freer information environment. Governments accustomed to controlling narratives rarely become comfortable with unpredictable scrutiny, especially during conflict.
That tension now defines modern Ethiopia.
The media accuses the government of selective openness. The government accuses the media of selective responsibility. Meanwhile, the centre keeps weakening.
The danger is not only repression. Nor is it only misinformation.
The greater danger is that Ethiopia may slowly lose the possibility of a shared factual space altogether.
Once societies stop agreeing on basic reality, politics becomes permanently combustible. Every tragedy becomes contested. Every conflict produces parallel truths. Every institution loses credibility. Public debate stops functioning as dialogue and turns into permanent psychological warfare.
Some signs of that erosion are already visible.
Professional journalism is financially strained. Outrage is profitable. Diaspora influence is growing. Ethnic alignment shapes audience loyalty. Self-censorship exists alongside reckless speech. Independent reporters fear detention while online propagandists thrive without accountability.
The irony is brutal: Ethiopia today may simultaneously have more speech and less trust than at any point in its modern history.
That is why the conversation triggered by this forum matters beyond the media industry itself.
The question is no longer whether Ethiopia should have a free press. That argument has already been settled by history and technology. The digital era has made total information control nearly impossible.
The real question is whether Ethiopia can still build a credible information culture before polarisation consumes institutional trust completely.
That cannot happen through state pressure alone. Nor through media outrage alone.
The government must accept that criticism is not sabotage. Journalists must accept that influence without discipline becomes dangerous in a fractured society. Regulators must avoid becoming political instruments. Media owners must stop rewarding chaos as a business strategy. Audiences themselves must relearn the value of verification in an economy driven by instant reaction.
None of this is easy. Countries with stronger institutions are struggling with the same problem.
But Ethiopia faces the challenge under far more fragile conditions: ethnic tension, armed conflict, weak institutions, economic pressure and one of Africa’s youngest, most digitally aggressive populations.
That combination makes the media question existential.
Not because journalism alone determines Ethiopia’s future.
But because societies eventually become what their information systems reward.
