Ethiopia’s foreign exchange system has long resembled a river with hidden currents: on the surface, trade flows appear orderly, yet beneath, under‑invoicing and mispriced imports divert resources, distort data, and undermine policy. The National Bank of Ethiopia’s recent directive requiring commercial banks to use Customs Commission price references as benchmarks for selected imports is an attempt to chart a clearer course.
But the question remains: can this measure truly plug the leaks, or will it merely skim the surface of a far deeper problem?
Under‑invoicing is not an isolated act of opportunism, it is a systemic response to policy gaps, institutional weaknesses, and misaligned incentives. For years, importers faced scarce foreign currency and banks lacked both the tools and authority to rigorously validate invoices. Customs reference prices, often outdated, offered leeway for creative interpretations.
Inter-agency coordination was fragmentary; the Ministry of Trade, banks, and revenue authorities operated in silos, leaving ample space for mispricing to thrive. In this environment, under‑invoicing was not merely a choice, it was a survival strategy.
Critics may argue that the new directive risks reintroducing control over market prices in a system that recently shifted to a market-based FX regime. Indeed, there is a danger that indicative benchmarks, treated rigidly, could constrain legitimate pricing flexibility.
Importers dealing in commodities with volatile global prices, fuel, machinery, or critical agricultural inputs, might find their FX allocations misaligned with real costs, slowing essential imports and increasing transaction friction. In effect, the measure could turn the very river it seeks to regulate into a series of small, choked channels.
Yet, proponents have a compelling case. For too long, the official FX market has been undermined by inconsistent data, misreported imports, and a parallel flow of currency into informal channels.
Under‑invoicing erodes government revenues, weakens statistical integrity, and perpetuates inequities: those connected or knowledgeable enough to navigate loopholes gain at the expense of compliant businesses and the public. By anchoring bank valuations to Customs reference prices, the NBE seeks to restore discipline and predictability, making the river less treacherous for everyone navigating it.
The debate, then, is not about whether the directive is necessary, it is, but about how it is implemented. Benchmarks must be dynamic, reflecting global price movements, and applied consistently across all banks and sectors. Enforcement must be backed by inter-agency coordination and digital integration to track invoices, LCs, and customs valuations in real time. Without these safeguards, the measure risks being symbolic rather than transformative, a mere patch over a gaping channel of illicit financial flows.
At its core, the fight against under‑invoicing is a fight for economic integrity. It is about ensuring that Ethiopia’s scarce foreign currency fuels productive imports rather than lining hidden pockets, that government revenues are secured, and that market signals reflect reality rather than manipulation.
The NBE’s directive is a significant step, but the river will not be tamed by a single dam. Only through systemic reform, bridging gaps between banks, customs, and regulatory authorities, can Ethiopia convert hidden currents into transparent streams that sustain growth and investment.
Under‑invoicing may have been tolerated because it was convenient; it allowed imports to flow, businesses to survive, and the economy to function despite scarcity. But convenience is a double-edged sword: what once seemed helpful now risks dragging the economy under. The challenge before policymakers, banks, and regulators is clear, close the loopholes decisively, or risk letting the invisible drain continue to siphon Ethiopia’s future.
